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) 
[L. A. No. 21344. In Bank. Apr. 27, 1951.J 
B. M. FREEDMAN, Appellant, v. THE RECTOR, WAR-
DENS and VESTRYMEN OF ST. MATTHIAS PAR-
ISH OF LOS ANGELES (8 Religious Corporation), 
Respondent. 
[1J Contracts-Performarce-Breach-Repudiation.-Even if the 
vendee, under the terms of the escrow instructions, had a 
reasonable time to perform after he unconditionally repudiated 
the contract, such repudiation, if acted upon by the vendor 
before it was retracted, excuses performance on the vendor's 
part and makes plaintiff's repudiation a total breach of the 
contract. 
[2] Specific Performance-Availability of Remedy.-A vendee was 
not entitled to damages or to specific performance of a con-
tract for the purchase of realty where his offer to purchase, 
made after r~pudiating the contract, was subject to a condition 
which he had 110 right to impose and hence did not constitute a 
withdrawal of the earlier repudiation. 
[3] Forfeitures - Relief Against.-Although Civ. Code, § 3275, 
provides for relief from forfeiture only where the breach of 
(2) See 23 Cal.Jur. 82; 49 Am.Jur. 82. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Contracts, § 246; [2] Specific Per-
formance, § 5; [3] Forfeitures, § 16; [4] Damages, § 136; [5-7] 
Damages, § 117; [8] Vendor alJd Purchaser, § 136; [9] Vendor and 
Purchaser, § 127; [10] Damages, § 133. 
') 
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the one seeking relief was neither wilful, fraudulent, nor 
grossly negligent, the damage provisions of such code, together 
with the policy of the law against penalties and forfeitures, 
prv 7 ide an alternative basis for relief independent of such 
section. . 
[4) Damages-Punitive Damages.-To permit what are in effect 
punitive damages merely because a party has partially per-
formed his contract before his breach is inconsistent with Civ. 
Code, § 3294, limiting the right to exemplary damages, and 
§§ 1670, 1671, dealing with liquidated damages. 
[6] ld.-Penalties.-A penalty need not take the form of a stipu-
lated fixed sum. 
[6] ld.-Penalties.-A penalty comprising a forfeiture without 
regard to actual damage suffered is unenforceable, and cannot 
reasonably be justified as punishment for one who wilfully 
breaches his contract. 
[7] ld.-Penalties.-The policy of the law against allowing ex-
emplary damages for breach of contract is expressed in Civ. 
Code, § 3294, and if a penalty were to be imposed for such 
breach it should bear some rational relationship to its pur-
pose; a penalty equal to the net benefits conferred by part 
performance bears no such relationship. 
[8] Vendor and Purchaser-Forfeiture of Purchaser's Interest-
Relief forom Forfeiture.-On a· vendee's default where denial 
of restitution would result in imposition of punitive damages, 
the court may invoke Civ. Code, §§ 3275, 3294, 3369, which 
respectively provide for relief from forfeiture, for exemplary 
damages, and that relief will not be granted to enforce a 
penalty or forfeiture. 
[9) ld.-Forfeiture of Purchaser's Interest.-A contract provision 
for retention of the down payment after default of a purchaser 
of real property is presumptively valid, where the down pay-
ment is reasonable. 
[10] Damages-Liquidated Damages-Real Estate Transactions.-
A contract provision allowing the seller of real property to 
retain the down payment on the purchaser's default will not 
be enforced as one for liquidated damages, where it is not im-
practicable or extremely difficult to fix actual damages. ( Civ. 
Code, §§ 1670,1671.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. George Francis, Judge.· Reversed in part 
and affirmed in part. 
[3] See 12 Oal.Jur. 639. 
[4] See 8 Oa1.Jur. 861; 15 Am.Jm. 698. 
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council 
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Action for specific performance of contract to sell real 
property or for damages. Judgment for defendant reversed 
insofar as it denied plaintiff restitution of any part of his down 
payment, with directions to retry issue of amount thereof to 
which he was entitled; affirmed in all other respects. 
Blase A. Bonpane and L. H. Phillips for Appellant. 
Steiner A. Larsen for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On October 8, 1947, plaintiff signed a de-
posit agreement with Clarence Urban, a real estate broker, 
for the purchase of two lots owned by defendant. He paid 
$2,000 down and agreed to pay the balance of $16,000 into 
escrow within 30 days. Both parties signed the escrow in-
structions a few days later. Although the deposit agreement 
was ambiguous with respect to title requirements, the escrow 
instructions provided that the property should be- free of 
encumbrances except "covenants, conditions, restrictions, 
reservations, rights, rights of way, (and] easements ... now 
of record." There was evidence that at the time plaintiff 
signed the escrow instructions he was informed of all cove-
nants and easements affecting the property, but he took the 
position thereafter that he was under no obligation to purchase 
the property until the title had been cleared. On November 
20th the escrow agent informed plaintiff that the title was 
clear except for an easement held by the water and power 
department across the rear 5 feet of one of the lots. This 
easement was abandoned the following April. On November 
28th plaintiff wrote· defendant and the escrow agent repudiat-
ing the contract and demanding the return of his deposit. 
He stated that the property had been misrepresented to him 
and that defendant had failed to clear the title as required 
by the contract. On December 19th plaintiff wrote defendant 
that he would take title and pay the balance of the purchase 
price as soon as the easement had been cleared. Defendant. 
however, on December 27th cancelled the escrow and there-
after sold the property to a third party for $20,000. Early in 
January plaintiff indicated his willingness to purchase the 
property and shortly thereafter brought this suit for specific 
performance. The trial court entered judgment for defendant 
and plaintiff appeals. 
[1] Plaintiff's main contention is that the contract was still 
in eife('t when he sought to perform in January after defendant 
i,) 
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had cancelled the escrow and arranged for the sale of the 
property to a third party. He bases this contention on the 
theory that time was not of the essence of the contract and 
that therefore defendant could not terminate his rights under 
it without giving him notice to perform within a reasonable 
time after the closing date, November 10th, fixed in the 
escrow instructions. This contention overlooks the fact, how-
ever, that plaintiff unconditionally repudiated the contract 
by his letters of November 28th. Even if it is assumed that 
under the terms of the escrow instructions plaintiff bad a 
reasonable time to perform after November 28th, his repudia-
tion on that date if acted upon by defendant before it was 
retracted, would excuse performance on defendant's part and 
make plaintiff's repudiation a total breach of contract. (Gold 
Min. & Water Co. v. Swinerton, 23 Ca1.2d 19, 29 [142 P.2d 
22] ; see, Restatement, Contracts, §§ 280, 318, 319; Civ. Code, 
§ 1440.) 
[2] Although plaintiff made various oral proposals to con-
tinue with the purchase on terms other than those provided 
in the contract, he did not unconditionally withdraw his re-
pudiation until after defendant, in reliance thereon, had sold 
the property to another. Plaintiff's letter of December 19th 
expressed Willingness to perform the contract only after the 
I 
easement held by the water and power department had been 
abandoned. The escrow instructions provided, however, that 
the title should be subject to easements of record. There was 
evidence that plaintiff read the instructions and was informed 
of the easement at the time he signed them. Since his letter 
of December 19th contained a condition with respect to the 
clearance of the easement that he had no right to impose, 
it did not constitute a withdrawal of the earlier repudiation. 
(Steelduet v. Henger-Seltzer Co., 26 Ca1.2d 634, 646 [160 I 
P.2d 804] ; Alderson v. Houston, 154 Cal. 1, 14 [96 P. 884J.) . 
Accordingly, the jl1dgment must be affirmed insofar as it 
denies plaintift' specllk p",rformance or damages for breach 
of contract. 
The question remains whether plaintift' is entitled to the 
return of any part of his down payment. Since defendant 
resold the property for $2,000 more than plaintiff had agreed 
to pay for it, it is clear that defendant suffered no damage 
as a result of plaintift"s breach. If defendant is allowed tc 
retain the amount of the down payment in excess of its expense: 
in connection with the contract it will be enriched and plaintif 
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will suffer a penalty in excess of any damages he caused. 
Under our recent holdings in Barkis v. Scott, 34 Ca1.2d 116 
[208 P.2d 367], and Baffa v. John.~on, 35 Cal.2d 36 [216 P.2d 
13), plaintiff could recover that excess under section 3275 of 
the Civil Code, if his breach was neither wilful, fraudulent. 
nor grossly negligent. The trial court found, however, on 
substantial evidence, that plaintiff's breach was wilful. It 
is necessary to consider, therefore, the question left open in 
the Baffa case, namely, whether a vendee under such circum-
stances may recover the excess of his part payment over the 
damage he caused the vendor. 
[3] As was pointed out in the Baffa case, if the right to 
restitution rests solely on the provisions of section 3275, a 
vendee who has been guilty of a wilful default must be denied 
relief. We have concluded, however, that the damage pro-
visions of the Civil Code, together with the policy of the law 
against penalties and forfeitures provide an alternative basis 
for relief independent of section 3275. ..-
" Few questions in the law have given rise to more discussion 
and difference of opinion than that concerning the right of one 
who bas materially broken his contract without legal excuse 
to recover for such benefits as he may have conferred on the 
other party by part performance. . . . A satisfactory solu-
tion is not easy, for two fundamental legal policies seem here 
to come in conflict. On the one hand, it seems a violation of 
the terms of a contract to allow a plaintiff in default to recover 
-to allow a party to stop when he pleast's and sell his part 
performance at a value fixed by the jury to the defendant who 
has agreed only to pay for full performance. On the other 
hand, to deny recovery often gives the defendant more than fair 
compensation for the injury he has sustained and imposes a 
forfeiture on the plaintiff. The mores of the time and place 
will oftf'n determine which policy will be followed. But the 
second of these opposing policies has steadily increased in favor 
in recent years." (5 Williston on Contracts [rev. ed.] § 1473, 
p.4118.) 
In adopting a rule allowing restitution to the defaulting 
vendee the Supreme Court of Utah stated: 
"The vital question to be determined is: What is the 
correct measure of damages in a case of this kind f Shall 
we apply the rule of compensatory demages, or is it a case in 
which punitive damages should be allowed' Upon what prin-
ciple can punitive damages or damages in excess of compensa-
) 
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tion for the injury done be justified in the case at bar 7 These 
are questions that appeal both to the judgment and conscience 
of the court. . . . 
"The rule contended for by respondent, carried to its logi-
cal sequence, would forfeit every dollar paid by appellant and 
still leave respondent in possession of the land even if appel-
lants had paid the last installment but one, and then defaulted. 
In answer to this, it may be said that such is not the cas~ at bar. 
But where are we going to draw the linef" (Malmberg v. 
Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 340, 345 [218 P. 975]; see, also. Mc-
Cormick on Damages, § 153, p. 616; Corbin, The Right of a 
Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Instalments Paid, 40 
Yale L. J.1013.) 
The failure of courts adopting a contrary viewpoint to 
recognize that they are permitting unjustifiable penalties for 
breach of contract has led to the comment that "The law, 
while looking with righteous abhorrence on forfeitures. and 
washing its hands of their enforcement, after the manner of 
Pontius Pilate, yet has been reluctant to intervene with affirm-
ative relief or to formulate any consistent principle condemn-
ing the validity of cut-throat provisions which in their essence 
involve forfeitures. Although the law will not assist in the 
vivisection of! the victim, it will often permit the creditor 
to keep his pound of flesh if he can carve it for himself." 
(Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of Contract, 5 Minn.L. 
Rev. 329, 341.) 
[4] To permit what are in effect punitive damages merely 
because a party has partially performed his contract before 
his breach is inconsistent both with section 32941 of the Civil 
Code limiting the right to exemplary damages and sections 
16702 and 16718 dealing with liquidated damages. [6, 6] "A 
penalty need not take the form of a stipulated fixed sum; any 
"'In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from 
contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or 
malice, express or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the aetual dam· 
ages, may reeover damages for the sake of example and by way of 
punishing the defendant." 
"'Every contract by which the amount of damage to be paid, or 
other compensation to be made, for a breaeh of an obligation, is deter· 
mined in antieipation thereof, is to that extent void, exeept as expressly 
provided in the next. section." 
I" The parties toa contraet may agree therein upon an amount which 
shall be ore!lumed to be the amount of damage sustained by a breaeh 
thereof, when, from the nature of the case, it would be impraeticable 
or extremely diffieult to fix the aetual damage." 
I 
! 
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proVlsIOn by which money or proptrty would be forfeited 
without regard to the actual damage suffered would be an 
unenforceable penalty." (Ebbert v. Mercantile Trust Co., 
213 Cal. 496, 499 [2 P.2d 776].) Such penalties cannot 
reasonably be justified as punishment for one who wilfully 
breaches his contract. [7] Not only does section 3294 of the 
Civil Code express the policy of the law against the allowance 
of exemplary damages for breach of contract regardless of 
the nature of the breach (Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Ca1.2d 480,486 
[196 P.2d 915]), but if a penalty were to be imposed it should 
bear some rational relationship to its purpose. A penalty 
equal to the net benefits conferred by part performance bears 
no such relationship. It not only fails to take into considera-
tion the degree of culpability, but its severity increases as the 
seriousness of the breach decreases. Thus a vendee who 
breaches bis eon tract before he has benefited the vendor by 
part performance suffers no penalty, whereas one who has 
almost completely performed his contract suffers the maximum 
penalty. 
Moreover, to deny the remedy ot restitution because a breach 
is wilful would create an anomolous situation when considered 
with section 3369 of the Civil Code. That section provides that 
"Neither specific nor preventive relief can be granted to 
enforce a penalty or forfeiture in any case . . .• " and pre-
cludes the court from quieting the vendor's title unless he 
refunds the excess of the part payments over the damage 
caused by the vendee's breach. (Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Cal.2d 
36,39 [216 P.2d 13] ; Barki.~ v. Scott, 34 Ca1.2d 116, 121 [208 
P.2d 367], and cases cited.) Unless the same rule is adopted 
when the vendee seeks restitution, the rights of the parties 
under identical fact situations will turn on the chance of which 
one first seeks the aid of the court. 
[8] In Glock v. Howard & Wt7son Colony Co., 123 Cal. 
1 [55 P. 713, 69 Am.St.Rep. 17, 43 L.R.A. 199], the court 
stated that on the vendee's default the vendor could stand 
on his contract and retain both the land and any payments 
that had been made. That statement was made without ref-
erence to sections 3275, 3294, and 3369 of the Civil Code. It 
is probable that these code sections were not invoked in the 
Glock case and similar cases because the vendee was unable to 
prove that the vendor's retention of both the land and pay-
ments would result in the imposition of punitive damages. 
(See Barkisv. Scott, supra, 34 Cal.2d 116, 121.) In the present 
case, however, denial of restitution would result in the imposi-
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tion of punitive damagcN, and the foregoing sections may 
therefore be invoked. 
The provision of the contract providing that on plaintiff's 
default defendant could retain the down payment cannot be 
enforced as a valid clause providing for liquidated damages. 
[9, 10] Although such a provision in a contract for the sale of 
real property is presumptively valid, if the down payment is 
reasonable in amount (Wright v. Rodgers, 198 Cal. 137, 142-
143 [243 P. 866] ; Civ. Code, § 3387), when as in this case the 
evidence establishes that it would not "be impracticable or 
extremely difficult to fix the actual damages" (Civ. Code, 
§ 1671), such a provision may not be enforced as one for 
liquidated damages. (Civ. Code, § 1670; Wright v. Rodgers, 
supra, 198 Cal. 137, 144; see, also, Petrovich v. City of Arcadia, 
36 Cal.2d 78, 85 [222 P .2d 231].) 
Since a commission of $900 was retained by the broker from 
the down payment it is clear that defendant received from 
plaintiff at most $1,100. Defendant contends, however, that 
there were other expenses incurred in connection with the 
escrow that reduced the amount of the down payment received. 
Since the trial court erroneously concluded that plaintiff could 
recover no part of his down payment, no finding was made as 
to the fraction that accrued to the net benefit of defendant. 
Accordingly, a new trial limited to that issue is appropriate. 
(See, Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal.2d 791, 801 
[197 P.2d 713].) 
The judgment is reversed insofar as it denies plaintiff resti-
tution of any part of his down payment and the trial court 
is directed to retry the issue of the amount thereof to which he 
is entitled. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed. 
Each party is to bear his own costs on this appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Spence, 
J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I would affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied May 24, 
1951. Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing. 
